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Abstract 
Employees’ compliance behavior with information security policies has been extensively 
researched yet. In particular, many studies identified and explained measures that 
increase employees’ security compliance such as trainings and controls. Although the 
identification and explanation of these measures is valuable for managers, these 
findings are insufficient. Since managers need to balance limited resources, they need to 
be able to prioritize and invest in the most effective measures for improving employees’ 
security compliance.  
Therefore, to complement extant research, we survey 332 employees in an organization 
that has established 15 security measures. Our results provide managers with a 
quantitative assessment of these 15 security measures. Furthermore, we discuss the 
implications of our findings and give recommendations for managers. In addition, our 
results may also be valuable for theorists because, e.g., we show and explain which type 
of information security agent is most effective.  
Keywords: Information security/privacy, training, data security, change agent, 
compliance behavior.  
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Introduction 
The latest SIM IT Key Issues study revealed security as the number one “worrisome technology for IT 
leaders” (University of Minnesota 2014). It is well understood that security attacks increasingly cause fatal 
consequences. For instance, in 2014 attackers were able to obtain login credentials from eBay employees 
and copy 233 million personal user records (DataBreaches.net 2014; Forbes 2014). Further recent and 
popular examples include, e.g., an attack on the bank JPMorgan Chase in which 80 million customer 
records were stolen over a period of three months (Bloomberg 2014; Reuters 2014) and an attack on the 
retailer Target in which 70 million customer records were stolen – including 40 million credit and debit 
card numbers (Target 2015). These security attacks lead to the question why extant research has not yet 
been able to provide effective guidance to organizations for improving information systems (IS) security.  
For many years, IS security research emphasized technology-based solutions to fight IS security threats 
(e.g., Spears and Barki 2010; Whitman 2004). Although these types of solutions improve security (Straub 
1990), they have been criticized for being insufficient (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; 
Siponen 2005a), because they neither investigate users as a problem (Stanton and Stam 2006; Whitman 
2008), nor users as an asset to fight attacks (Siponen 2005b; Spears and Barki 2010), nor any other socio-
organizational predictors of IS security (Boss and Kirsch 2007; Siponen et al. 2007). Therefore, the IS 
security discipline started to investigate socio-organizational predictors such as employees’ compliance 
behavior with information security policies (ISPs; e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Dittes et al. 2015; Herath and 
Rao 2009; Siponen and Vance 2010; Siponen et al. 2010).  
However, the emphasis of extent research has been on revealing and explaining antecedents of employees’ 
compliance behavior with ISPs. As a consequence, practical insights for managers have been limited to 
recommendations based on theoretical findings. That is, many studies focus on specific measures for 
improving security compliance behavior. For instance, Johnston et al. (2015) recently focused on 
sanctions and found that sanctions enforced by the organization have a smaller influence on compliance 
behavior than informal sanctions imposed by peer groups. From this the authors concluded that 
managers should “encourage the development of an environment that includes informal gatherings that 
could facilitate the use of informal sanctions” (Johnston et al. 2015, p. 130). However, the authors did not 
compare the effectiveness of their recommendations to alternative approaches that do not use sanctions. 
Another example in which the authors focus on a specific class of security measure is the study of 
Puhakainen and Siponen (2010). In their study, the authors design and develop effective security 
trainings. As a consequence, their implications for practitioners focus on using specific training methods 
such as “methods and ideas that enable learner’s systematic cognitive processing of information” 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010, p. 775) but are not compared against potential alternative security 
measures such as controls or sanctions.  
Besides studies focusing on specific security measures, several IS security scholars have reviewed and 
summarized potential security measures. For instance, Tu and Yuan (2014) reviewed and identified 
dependencies between critical success factors for effective information security management. However, 
their work does not compare the reviewed security measures according to their effectiveness. Similarly, 
D’Arcy et al. (2014) reflected on measures that influence employees’ security behavior. However, their 
summary of measures for improving employees’ security behavior also does not compare the effectiveness 
of these measures.  
Without any doubt, the identification and explanation of measures for improving employees’ security 
behavior is valuable, interesting, helpful and important for managers. However, we argue that 
identification and explanation of security measures are not sufficient. Managers also need to be able to 
relate alternative measures to each other. As implied by the word management itself, managers need to 
make decisions about controlling and allocating limited available resources efficiently and effectively 
(Merriam-Webster 2015). Organizations cannot simply invest into and implement all recommended 
security measures because their resources (mostly financial capital and human capital) are limited. 
Therefore, managers need to focus their investments and prioritize the most promising measures for 
improving their employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs. To aid managers with this, we investigate the 
following research question: Which measures are perceived by employees to be most effective for 
improving employees’ compliance behavior with information security policies?  
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To address this research question, we review and synthesize extant literature by developing a framework 
of measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs. Subsequently, we empirically 
investigate an organization who implemented 15 distinct security measures three years before the study 
was conducted. First, we show how the implemented security measures map to our literature-based 
framework. After that, we ask employees to assess the effectiveness of the 15 security measures based on 
their personal experiences.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the results of our literature review 
and develops a framework of measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs. 
Subsequently, section 3 introduces our survey and the field partner at which the survey was conducted. 
We also explain how the different security measures are implemented at the field partner. After that, 
section 4 shows the results of the survey and section 5 discusses their value, novelty and limitations. 
Finally, section 6 concludes this article and gives recommendations for managers.  
Literature Review 
The objective of our work is to quantify and rank the effectiveness of measures for improving employee’s 
compliance behavior with ISPs. Such a quantitative ranking is valuable for organizations because it allows 
managers to balance and prioritize their investments. 
We first review literature and synthesize a framework that describes different classes of security measures 
to increase employees’ compliance with ISPs (Webster and Watson 2001). Since other scholars reviewed 
information security measures previously (D’Arcy and Herath 2011; Puhakainen and Siponen 2010; Tu 
and Yuan 2014) we focused on one popular database for our review, i.e., AISeL, and conducted an 
extensive backward search based on the identified articles. We conducted two rounds of literature search. 
In the first round, we used the search string “security” in combination with the keyword “security”. This 
yielded 118 hits. We scanned the titles and abstracts and downloaded 18 articles of which 10 turned out to 
recommend specific security measures. Most of the articles that we omitted focused on technical design 
principles for increasing information security or contrasting security and privacy. In the second round, we 
used the search string “compliance behavior” (without any limiting keyword). However, as this search 
string resulted in 1614 hits, we narrowed the search down to journal articles. Furthermore, since similar 
literature reviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011 (e.g., D’Arcy and Herath 2011; Puhakainen and 
Siponen 2010), we narrowed the search to publications within 2011-2015. This yielded 122 hits. We 
ignored articles that we already scanned in the first round and, based on titles and abstracts, downloaded 
8 additional articles of which 5 turned out to recommend specific security measures. Most of the articles 
that we omitted in the second literature search round focused on process management or already resulted 
from the first round. Finally, we checked for additional articles referenced in the relevant articles 
(backward search). This yielded further 26 articles. Thus, our review was based on 41 articles in total. 
Appendix A provides a list of all reviewed articles. 
Building on the identified set of articles, we developed a framework that describes six classes of security 
measures: trainings, informational materials, controls, security agents, sanctions, and incentives. 
Organizations may instantiate these classes with specific security measures. For instance, organizations 
may establish specific types of trainings (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010) or introduce specific types of 
sanctions (D’Arcy and Herath 2011; Johnston et al. 2015). Appendix A provides a concept matrix that 
indicates which class of security measure has been examined and/or discussed in a certain article.  
Trainings. One of the most studied approaches for improving employees’ compliance with ISPs are 
trainings (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). Trainings typically incorporate a pedagogical orientation as a 
primary means of improving user compliance with ISPs. A comprehensive literature review specifically 
focusing on IS security trainings is provided by Puhakainen and Siponen (2010).  
Informational Materials. As a second class we identified informational materials. These are mostly 
tangible assets which illustrate correct compliance behavior and typical mistakes. These include, for 
instance, posters (Rudolph et al. 2002), leaflets (Hadland 1998; Murray 1991; Peltier 2000, 2002; 
Spurling 1995), and gadgets (Rudolph et al. 2002). However, also intangible assets such as e-mails may be 
used as a medium for spreading knowledge about ISPs and security compliance behavior (Murray 1991; 
Spurling 1995; Thompson and von Solms 1997). 
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Controls. Monitoring compliance behavior (Lampe et al. 2013) and conducting regular controls are a 
common measure for improving employees’ compliance behavior (Rudolph et al. 2002; Perry 1985; Kwon 
and Johnson 2011). Organizations have responded to the growing list of security threats through a 
combination of technical, administrative, and physical controls (D’Arcy and Herath 2011). Depending on 
their severity, some controls should be conducted by external parties while other controls may be 
conducted by employees themselves (Johnston et al. 2010).  
Security Agents. Security agents are internal employees who specialize in disseminating knowledge 
about ISPs in their organization (Peltier 2000, 2002; Perry 1985). Besides deep knowledge about 
security-related topics, they also have strong knowledge about their colleagues’ tasks and work routines. 
Although every organization may define the role of a security agent differently, several characteristics can 
be highlighted. For instance, security agents typically train and support colleagues as well as persuade 
them to comply with ISPs (Johnston et al. 2010; Warkentin et al. 2011). They may also maintain and 
control IS user authorizations and define to what degree specific business data needs to be protected.  
Sanctions. As a fifth class of security measure for improving employees’ compliance with ISPs, we 
identified the use of sanctions (Liang et al. 2013; Siponen et al. 2007; Straub 1990). Deterrence-based 
approaches argue that fear of sanctions determines whether employees comply with the policies (Akers 
and Sellers 1994; Johnston et al. 2015; Straub 1990; Siponen et al. 2007). According to avoidance 
motivation theorists, individuals are generally motivated to avoid threats (Liang and Xue 2010). However, 
extant research provides inconsistent and partly contradictory findings regarding the use of sanctions in 
the context of compliance with ISPs (e.g., D’Arcy and Herath 2011). A detailed review dealing with 
sanctions in the information security area is provided by Johnston et al. (2015). 
Rewards. Similarly to sanctions, literature found that rewards (e.g., financial incentives or promotions) 
also increase employees’ IS security behavior (Liang et al. 2013). While sanctions are perceived as costs of 
non-compliance by employees, rewards are perceived as benefits of compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
However, results regarding the effectiveness of rewards have been ambiguous. Multiple studies have not 
been able to statistically confirm a benefit of rewards on employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs (e.g., 
Boss and Kirsch 2007; Pahnila et al. 2007). For instance, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) studied incentives and 
found that rewards cause statistically significant improvements in employees’ compliance behavior with 
ISPs if employees are informed about the rewards in advance. The announcement of the possibility to be 
rewarded increases employees’ intrinsic motivation to comply and, thus, improves their security behavior 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010).  
To conclude our review, we identified six classes of measures for improving employees’ compliance 
behavior with ISPs. In the following, we will present our study setting and explain how our field partner 
implemented the identified classes of security measures.  
Research Method 
Study Setting  
Our study was conducted within the corporate purchasing department of ALPHA (pseudonym). ALPHA is 
a large, multinational engineering company with its headquarters in Germany. Alpha is a leading supplier 
of numerous technologies and has more than 100,000 employees working in more than 100 countries. 
ALPHA was apt for this study, because security-related topics are taken very seriously at ALPHA. 
Specifically, ALPHA already had 15 distinct security measures in place that could be mapped to our 
framework. Thus, employees at ALPHA were able to compare and assess the effectiveness of different 
measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs based on their personal experiences. 
In 2009, ALPHA centralized most of its purchasing activities in the corporate purchasing unit 
PURCHASER (pseudonym). PURCHASER was particularly suited for this study, because, as ALPHA’s 
purchasing unit, it initiates the highest cash outflow and, thus, represents one of the most important 
business units for implementing high information security standards. PURCHASER employs 3’000 
employees in its German headquarters and further 3’000 employees in Australia, Asia, Europe, North 
America, and Latin America. Overall, these 6’000 employees manage a cumulated purchasing volume of 
approximately $20 billion each year. Thus, it is crucial for ALPHA that all employees at PURCHASER 
comply with the defined ISPs because non-compliant behavior can have fatal consequences. For instance, 
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if details about contracts with suppliers would “get out”, this would severely weaken PURCHASER’s 
position in future negotiations. Similarly, if unauthorized users would not only be able to access 
information but even be able to execute transactions, huge financial losses could be generated due to the 
budget that PURCHASER manages.  
Importantly, at PURCHASER many departments already established a security agent who informs fellow 
colleagues about new information security trends and developments. These security agents consult and 
train their colleagues and create and maintain detailed security concepts for all departments. At 
PURCHASER each department has a department security concept which, for instance, defines employees’ 
business roles, assigns technical authorizations to specific business roles, and defines sensitivity and 
criticality of data and applications. However, as not all departments had introduced a security agent yet, 
our study focused on those departments that had a security agent for at least three months when the study 
was conducted. Combined these departments employed 2’300 employees. Most of them had a security 
agent for approx. three years because they introduced their security agent right away when PURCHASER 
itself was established as a business division within ALPHA.  
In the following, we instantiate the security measure classes of our framework with the specific security 
measures implemented at PURCHASER. After talking to PURCHASER’s senior security manager and 
observing two individual trainings and two training workshops, we distinguished 15 specific information 
security measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs that were already 
implemented at PURCHASER. Furthermore, since we focused on measures that employees have already 
experienced, employees at PURCHASER were able to compare and assess the effectiveness of those 
measures in relation to each other.  
Trainings. PURCHASER differentiates five training measures: individual trainings (with regards to 
personal training sessions with a trainer), group trainings and workshops (Thompson and von Solms 
1997), mandatory trainings (e.g., if employees need to participate in a specific training module once a 
year; Boss and Kirsch 2007; Mitnick 2002), web-based training programs (Cox et al. 2001), and training 
presentations provided via global web conferences.  
Informational Materials. PURCHASER uses four types of informational material in order to increase 
awareness about ISPs and to give practical examples about good and bad behaviors. Specifically, at 
PURCHASER large posters are pinned to many office walls. Furthermore, leaflets are frequently handed 
out to employees personally and deposited at frequently visited corridors. In addition, PURCHASER uses 
several gadgets to increase awareness about security-related topics. These include, for instance, coffee 
cups, mouse pads, pens, key holders. Also, e-mails are sent around by security agents weekly or bi-weekly 
in which the security agent summarizes his or her most recent observations.  
Controls. A specific type of controls are audits (Kayworth and Whitten 2010). Audits are official 
examinations of employees’ compliance behavior with existing ISPs. At PURCHASER, audits are 
conducted by an external auditor from another organization or institution. PURCHASER distinguishes 
audits from self-checks that are conducted by an internal auditor – typically the information security 
agent. Furthermore, PURCHASER distinguishes audits based on who sponsors and initiates them. This is 
important because self-checks and audits are sponsored and initiated by executives and managers and, 
thus, potentially biased. To mitigate this bias, PURCHASER also introduced controls sponsored and 
initiated by the revision department. The specialty of these controls is that the results of these controls are 
not reported to the executive board but directly the supervisory board.  
Security Agents. PURCHASER differentiates between full-time security agents and part-time security 
agents. While a full-time security agent works only in his or her role as a security agent, a part-time 
security agent only works in the role of a security agent for a specific percentage of his or her working 
hours – typically 10%-20%. Importantly, full-time security agents represent the security agent for 
multiple departments. Conversely, part-time security agents are primarily “ordinary” employees within a 
specific department and “only” work in the role of a security agent for that specific department. As a 
consequence, part-time security agents typically have less knowledge about security-related topics but a 
better understanding about their colleagues’ work routines than full-time security agents. Furthermore, a 
part-time security agent only reports to his or her own department’s head, while a full-time security agent 
reports to multiple department heads.  
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Sanctions. At PURCHASER, security agents were able to assign sanctions to employees for repeated 
non-compliance. These sanctions included increasing the frequency of mandatory trainings for specific 
employees or assigning additional training sessions to them.  
Rewards. We excluded rewards from this study, because employees at PURCHASER did not receive 
specific rewards for complying with ISPs.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the implemented security measures at PURCHASER.  
 
Table 1. Overview of Security Measures at PURCHASER. 
Class Security Measure Description 
T
ra
in
in
g
s 
Individual trainings 
One employee receives personal instructions by a security trainer. 
No further employees are participating in this training session. 
Group trainings and 
workshops 
Multiple employees receive instructions during the same training 
session. These training session are conducted via in-person 
conferences/presentations.  
Mandatory trainings Ongoing trainings at a specified frequency, e.g. once a year 
Trainings via global web 
conferences 
A training session that is conducted by a human trainer via global 
web conferences. It is typically shared across remote locations using 
the internet.  
Web-based trainings 
A training program in which the employee participates (e.g., 
multiple choice questions for testing his/her knowledge about the 
ISPs. The employee does not interact with a human trainer. 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
m
a
te
ri
a
ls
 
Posters A large printed picture or notice which can be pinned to a wall 
Leaflets Flyer and newsletters which provide information about ISPs 
Gadgets 
Trinkets and giveaways providing information about ISPs (e.g., 
cups, pens, mouse pads) 
Information via e-mails Frequent reminders providing information about ISPs  
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 Self-checks Examination of compliance with ISPs through an internal auditor 
ISP-audits Official examination of compliance with ISPs by an external auditor 
Checks by the revision 
department 
Official examination of compliance with ISPs through an employee 
of the revision department  
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 a
g
en
ts
 
Full-time security agents 
An employee who acts as consultant and trainer regarding security 
topics and performs security-related tasks (e.g. user authorization). 
A full-time security agent can typically take care of multiple 
departments. 
Part-time security agents 
Similar to a full-time security agent. However, since a part-time 
security agent has less time resources, he or she typically can only 
take care of one department. 
S
a
n
ct
io
n
s 
Sanctions for  
non-compliance 
Punishments for individuals that do not comply with ISPs  
Survey 
To quantify the perceived effectiveness of different measures for improving security behavior, we 
administered a survey at PURCHASER. The survey asked participants to assess the effectiveness of each 
of the 15 measures for improving security behavior on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from “not 
effective” (1) to “very effective” (5). The link to the survey was distributed to participants via e-mail. 
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Furthermore, the survey ran on a specific, organization-internal survey server. This server had previously 
been approved by experts from IT and all of PURCHASER’s worker’s councils. These approvals were 
important because they assured that (1) participants’ were identified by the survey server as internal 
employees, (2) participants could not participate multiple times, and (3) data about participants was 
stored encrypted, protected, and separated from the assessments of the security measures. Consequently, 
we were able to guarantee anonymity to employees, while simultaneously keeping employees from 
participating more than once.  
Data collection took place during November and December 2012. We reached out to all employees at 
PURCHASER who were assigned to a department that already established a security agent for at least 
three months. Of 2,300 contacted employees, 379 employees participated in the survey. This led to a 
response rate of 16.5%. However, five employees did not completely fill out the survey and therefore their 
answers were ignored. In addition, responses of 42 participants were ignored because these participants 
stated that they would not know the information security agent assigned to them and/or would not have 
had at least one information security training at PURCHASER within the last three years. We removed 
their responses in order to assure that all participants were able to assess the security measures for 
improving security behavior based on personal experiences. Assessments based on personal experiences 
have shown to lead to more reliable results than assessments based on expectations (Brown et al. 2014). 
Eventually, data analysis was based on 332 usable responses. Table 2 summarizes respondent 
demographics. Since respondent demographics are very similar to PURCHASER’s overall employee 
demographics, we assume that this survey was not affected by non-response bias. The only difference was 
the high ratio of information security agents who participated in the study. However, as our survey was 
particularly interesting for information security agents, the high response rate within the group of 
information security agents was not surprising. Therefore, we decided to analyze the assessments for 
information security agents and non-information security agents separately.  
 
Table 2. Respondent Demographics.  
 Absolute Relative 
Usable responses 332 100% 
Selected survey 
language 
English 154 46% 
German 178 54% 
Years having worked 
at ALPHA 
Less than 1 60 21% 
1-3 71 25% 
3-7 47 17% 
More than 7 105 37% 
Not specified 49 n.a. 
Department  
Supporting 
business function 
158 54% 
Manufacturing 34 12% 
IT 44 15% 
R&D 27 9% 
Other 29 10% 
Not specified 40 n.a. 
Job role 
Employee 228 86% 
Manager 37 14% 
Not specified 67 n.a. 
“I am an information 
security agent.” 
Yes 72 22% 
No 260 78% 
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Results 
Measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs were assessed on a five-point Likert-
type scale ranging from “not effective” (1) to “very effective” (5). Table 3 shows the means and standard 
deviations of all measures. Besides overall assessments, we differentiate between assessments by 
employees working as information security agents and employees who are not working as information 
security agents. This differentiation is reasonable, because (1) information security agents have 
significantly deeper expertise in information security and privacy topics, (2) information security agents 
not only participate in security trainings but also provide trainings to their fellow colleagues, and (3) the 
assessment of the effectiveness of information security agents would likely depend on whether the person 
who makes the assessment is himself or herself working as an information security agent.  
Regarding differences between means of various measures, significance depends on the measures’ 
standard deviations. The higher a measure’s standard deviation, the less significant a given difference to 
another factor will be. Our significance tests revealed that (1) a difference between two means of at least 
0.11 is significant at the 5% significance interval, (2) a difference of at least 0.15 is significant at the 1% 
interval, and (3) a difference of at least 0.19 is significant at the 0.1% interval (all two-tailed and based on 
the average standard deviation of 1.04). 
Results demonstrate that overall information security agents and their fellow colleagues assess the 
effectiveness of security measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior in relation to each other 
similarly. However, information security agents tend to rate the measures’ effectiveness greater (except 
for the measure part-time security agents) than employees who are not information security agents. 
Figure 1 visualizes the results graphically.  
 
 
Figure 1. Results.  
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Table 3. Perceived Effectiveness of Measures for Improving Employee’s Compliance Behavior with ISPs. 
Measure 
Class of 
Measure 
All  
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Information  
Security Agents  
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Non-Information 
Security Agents 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Full-time security 
agent *1 
Security 
Agents 
3.83 (1.11) 4.76 (0.46) 3.57 (1.10) 
Group trainings and 
workshops 
Trainings 3.67 (0.97) 4.17 (0.78) 3.53 (0.97) 
ISP-Audits *2 Controls 3.64 (1.06) 4.24 (0.84) 3.47 (1.05) 
Self-Checks Controls 3.59 (0.95) 4.15 (0.84) 3.44 (0.92) 
Checks by the 
revision department 
Controls 3.55 (1.01) 3.71 (0.95) 3.51 (1.02) 
Mandatory trainings 
(e.g., once a year) 
Trainings 3.54 (0.97) 3.85 (0.97) 3.46 (0.96) 
Individual trainings Trainings 3.20 (1.10) 3.76 (0.98) 3.05 (1.09) 
Information via E-
Mail 
Inform. 
Materials 
2.99 (0.98) 3.28 (0.95) 2.91 (0.97) 
Sanctions for non-
compliance 
Sanctions 2.97 (1.11) 3.35 (1.14) 2.86 (1.08) 
Online trainings  Trainings 2.96 (0.97) 3.15 (0.92) 2.91 (1.00) 
Part-time security 
agent *3 
Security 
Agents 
2.95 (1.14) 2.93 (1.11) 2.96 (1.15) 
Trainings via global 
web conferences 
Trainings 2.84 (0.99) 3.39 (0.94) 2.69 (0.96) 
Gadgets *4 
Inform. 
Materials 
2.76 (1.11) 3.11 (1.15) 2.67 (1.07) 
Posters 
Inform. 
Materials 
2.68 (1.05) 3.15 (1.14) 2.55 (0.99) 
Leaflets 
Inform. 
Materials 
2.68 (1.07) 3.28 (1.04) 2.51 (1.01) 
Average 3.19 (1.04) 3.62 (0.95) 3.07 (1.02) 
N 332 72 (22%) 260 (78%) 
*1: Responsible for multiple departments; *2: Information Security and Privacy-Audits; *3: Responsible 
for one department; *4: E.g., cups, pens, mouse pads. 
 
Furthermore, we computed correlations between measures in order to check whether measures of a 
specific class according to the framework are evaluated similarly. Table 4a and Table 4b summarize all 
correlations between the identified measures for improving compliance behavior. Surprisingly, only 
measures of the class informational material and the class controls correlate with other measures of the 
same class. This indicates a need for further research which examines why the effectiveness of measures 
that belong to the same class (especially trainings) may be perceived differently. 
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Table 4a. Correlations 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
Full-time 
security agent 
1.00        
2 
Group trainings 
and workshops 
0.26*** 1.00       
3 ISP-Audits 0.21*** 0.24*** 1.00      
4 Self-Checks 0.20*** 0.17** 0.22*** 1.00     
5 
Checks by the 
revision 
department 
0.17** 0.19*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 1.00    
6 
Mandatory 
trainings 
(e.g., once a 
year) 
0.07 0.12* 0.18*** 0.02 0.13* 1.00   
7 
Individual 
trainings 
0.20*** 0.10 0.21*** 0.10 0.16** 0.09 1.00  
8 
Information via 
E-Mail 
0.10 0.09 0.13* 0.10 0.04 0.17** 0.10 1.00 
9 
Sanctions for 
non-compliance 
0.11* 0.14* 0.28*** 0.12* 0.29*** 0.14* 0.17** 0.13* 
10 Online trainings 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.15** 0.00 0.12* 0.13* 0.07 
11 
Part-time 
security agent 
-0.02 0.11* 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.11* 0.05 
12 
Trainings via 
global web 
conferences 
0.20*** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.14* 0.16** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.15** 
13 Gadgets 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.17** 0.01 0.20*** 0.12* 0.18*** 
14 Posters 0.06 0.17** 0.20*** 0.16** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 
15 Leaflets 0.10 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.10 0.14* 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.29*** 
Significance (two-tailed): *0.05; **0.01; ***0.001. 
 
Table 4b. Correlations 
Measure 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
9 Sanctions for non-compliance 1.00       
10 Online trainings 0.08 1.00      
11 Part-time security agent 0.03 0.01 1.00     
12 
Trainings via global web 
conferences 
0.15** 0.33*** 0.08 1.00    
13 Gadgets 0.14* 0.07 0.09 0.14* 1.00   
14 Posters 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.14* 0.31*** 0.36*** 1.00  
15 Leaflets 0.09 0.16** 0.14* 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.56*** 1.00 
Significance (two-tailed): *0.05; **0.01; ***0.001. 
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Discussion 
Implications 
In our survey, we asked employees to assess effectiveness of measures for improving employees’ 
compliance behavior with ISPs. The results are interesting from an academic as well as a practitioner 
perspective, because they show for which classes the identified measures actually correlate with one 
another and what the most and least effective measures for improving compliance with information 
security policies are. This is important, because if measures do not correlate with other measures of the 
same class, managers need to be particularly careful when selecting the measures they want to invest in. 
This is consistent with extant literature which found that, for some classes of security measures, there 
exist measures that significantly improve employees’ compliance with ISPs (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) as well 
as measures for which effects could not be confirmed (Boss and Kirsch 2007; Pahnila et al. 2007).  
Overall, our findings indicate that full-time security agents are perceived by far as the most effective 
measure for improving security behavior. They are followed by controls, group trainings and mandatory 
trainings which also are significantly more effective than the average measure. Besides, further measures, 
i.e., information via e-mail, sanctions, and online trainings, are still perceived as being more effective than 
part-time security agents. This is surprising, because one could have assumed that part-time security 
agents would be similarly effective as their full-time colleagues. Finally, trainings via web-conferences, 
gadgets (such as cups, pens, and mouse pads), posters, and leaflets represent the least effective measures 
for improving information security behavior.  
Furthermore, we found that employees who are working as information security agents tend to assess 
effectiveness of security measures in general higher than employees who are not working as information 
security agents. However, when looking at the assessments of single measures in relation to each other, 
the assessments by information security agents and non-information security agents are quite similar. 
This indicates a general selection bias. However, there are also a few security measures of which the 
effectiveness in relation to other security measures is experienced differently by information security 
agents and non-information security agents. In particular, information security agents experienced that 
the effectiveness of full-time security agents is much higher than the effectiveness of any other measure 
(difference of 0.61 to the second highest factor!). In addition, information security agents themselves 
perceived part-time information security agents as the least effective measure of all. In contrast, their 
colleagues who are not working as security information agents, assessed their effectiveness “only” a little 
below the average.  
This fact, that security agents rate all measures’ effectiveness greater than employees who are not security 
agents except for the measure part-time security agent, is very interesting. While a selection bias may be a 
reason why security agents rate all measures’ effectiveness greater, there is no obvious explanation why 
part-time security agents are an exception to this bias. However, based on our observations and 
experiences from working at PURCHASER (the first author worked full-time at PURCHASER’s 
information security department for six months), we believe that the primary reason why information 
security agents rate part-time security agents relatively low is, that part-time security agents frequently 
are faced with deadlines from other daily work. As a consequence, part-time security agents tend to work 
less hours in their role of information security agents than they should, because they need to free up some 
time in order to be able to meet deadlines in other roles. For instance, if part-time security agents are 
simultaneously project team members who need to complete certain tasks before a specific date, they tend 
to reduce their work as a security agent. Thus, a potential explanation for why security agents rated full-
time security agents very high and part-time security agents surprisingly low, may be that they wanted to 
express their dissatisfaction with the little amount of time that part-time security agents actually have left 
for working in their security agent role.  
Besides, the effectiveness of posters and leaflets is experienced differently by employees working as 
security agents and employees who are not working as security agents, too. Specifically, information 
security agents seem to overestimate the effectiveness of posters and leaflets. However, we believe that 
this may be caused by a selection bias because the difference is rather moderate and we did not find any 
reason at PURCHASER that would explain this difference.  
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Another interesting point is that all measures of the identified classes informational materials and 
controls correlate with measures from the same class at the 0.1% significance level. Since our results do 
not indicate a similar effect for the classes trainings and security agents, further research should focus on 
these two classes. Theories and frameworks could be developed that explain why some measures appear 
to be much more effective than other measures although they may be aggregated to the same class of 
security measures.  
To our knowledge, previous research merely identified security measures. No study yet attempted to 
quantify and compare their effectiveness in relation to each other. Hence, the results of this study are 
particularly interesting for managers, because the results enable managers to prioritize, balance and 
optimize their financial resources and human resources. In particular, we infer five specific 
recommendations for managers focusing on how to allocate limited resources below. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our work is subject to several limitations. First, we asked employees to assess the effectiveness of the 
identified security measures based on their experiences. As a consequence, the assessments represent 
personal perceptions. Second, we focused on one organizational unit, i.e., PURCHASER. We selected 
PURCHASER as field partner for this study because focusing on PURCHASER and its context allowed us 
to instantiate the identified classes of security measures with concrete security measures that had been 
adopted and experienced by employees before the study was conducted (Johns 2006). However, future 
research should fill, and potentially enhance, our framework with concrete security measures in further 
settings. Finally, our review and framework of security measures is limited with regards to our literature 
search strategy. For instance, other search terms, literature databases, outlets, books etc. could have 
yielded different results. Nevertheless, although our framework may be complemented when reviewing or 
conducting further studies, we believe that the identified classes of security measures already encompass 
the large majority of security measures that are frequently implemented in organizations.  
Conclusions and Recommendations for Managers 
Our study focuses on developing a conceptual framework and a quantitative assessment of measures for 
improving employees’ compliance behavior with ISPs. In particular, the study was conducted at 
PURCHASER. PURCHASER was apt for our study for several reasons: (1) security-related topics are 
taken very seriously, (2) 15 specific information security measures for improving employees’ compliance 
behavior with ISPs were already implemented at PURCHASER, and (3) employees at PURCHASER were 
able to compare and assess the effectiveness of those measures in relation to each other. Upon our 
findings, we draw five recommendations for managers.  
First, managers need to prioritize security measures in order to optimize resource exploitation. In 
particular, the greatest share of a security manager’s budget should be invested in full-time security 
agents as they represent the most effective security measure for increasing compliance with ISPs. Since 
they work full-time on security-related topics, they are able to develop extensive ISP knowledge and thus 
serve as great advisors for their fellow colleagues. To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies have yet 
examined and compared the effectiveness of full-time security agents and part-time security agents. 
Furthermore, this is not a trivial finding, because advocates of part-time security agents typcially argue 
that part-time security agents have deeper understanding of their colleagues daily work routines and, 
thus, can better put themselves in their colleagues’ position when training them. However, our results 
show that full-time security agents are perceived far more effective than part-time security agents and, 
thus, should be the preferred measure for improving employees’ security behavior. 
Second, consistent with our first recommendation, we infer that organizations should avoid establishing 
part-time security agents. Even regular e-mails, sanctions and online trainings are evaluated as being 
more effective in improving employees’ compliance behavior than part-time security agents. In contrast to 
full-time security agents, part-time security agents do not have enough time resources to develop 
sufficient expertise in security-related topics. Furthermore, it is likely that part-time security agents might 
be tempted to use the time they should be working as security agents for working on tasks that are not, or 
only little, related to information security. For instance, if a part-time security agent is simultaneously a 
member of a project team, he or she might be tempted (and even pressured) to use his or her working 
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hours for working towards project completion instead of working towards improving employees’ 
compliance with ISPs. 
Third, besides full-time security agents, organizations should emphasize controls, group trainings and 
mandatory trainings as means for improving employees’ compliance behavior. Controls, group trainings, 
and mandatory trainings are significantly more effective than the average security measure. 
Fourth, trainings via web-conferences, gadgets (e.g., cups, pens, mouse pads), posters, and leaflets are not 
sufficient security measures and organizations should not rely on them. However, as they demand 
relatively small resources, they are suited as complementary measures for improving employees’ 
compliance behavior with ISPs.  
Fifth, managers need to be particularly careful when investing in security trainings because the 
effectiveness of different types of trainings varies significantly. As a consequence, managers should 
carefully consider concrete instantiations of a particular class of security measures before spending their 
budget. Based on our results, we particularly recommend group trainings and workshops.  
Appendix A: Concept Matrix of Reviewed Literature 
As explained in section 2 (“Literature Review”), we conducted a structured literature review in order to 
develop a framework which describes classes of measures for improving employees’ compliance behavior 
with ISPs. Table 5 lists all identified articles and indicates to which of the classes each article is assigned. 
Table 5. Concept Matrix of Reviewed Literature.  
Article Trainings Informational 
Materials 
Controls Security 
Agents 
Sanctions Incentives 
Johnston et al. (2015)     X  
D’Arcy et al. (2014) X  X X   
Glisson and Welland (2014)   X    
Tu and Yuan (2014)  X  X X X  
Lampe et al. (2013)   X    
Liang et al. (2013)   X  X X 
Ramachandran et al. (2013) X      
Willison and Warkentin 
(2012) 
  X  X  
D’Arcy and Herath (2011)   X  X  
Karjalainen and Siponen 
(2011) 
X      
Kwon and Johnson (2011)   X    
Warkentin et al. (2011) X X  X   
Xu et al. (2011)   X    
Bulgurcu et al. (2010)     X X 
Johnston et al. (2010) X  X X   
Kayworth and Whitten 
(2010) 
X  X    
Liang and Xue (2010)   X  X  
Puhakainen and Siponen 
(2010) 
X      
Siponen and Vance (2010)     X  
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Table 5. Concept Matrix of Reviewed Literature.  
Article Trainings Informational 
Materials 
Controls Security 
Agents 
Sanctions Incentives 
Siponen et al. (2010)     X X 
Heikka (2008) X      
D’Arcy et al. (2009) X  X    
Knapp et al. (2009)   X    
Boss and Kirsch (2007)     X X 
Siponen et al. (2007)     X X 
Siponen (2005a, 2005b) X      
Mitnick (2002) X      
Peltier (2002) X X     
Rudolph et al. (2002) X X X    
Peltier (2000) X X     
Hadland (1998) X X     
Straub and Welke (1998)    X   
Thomson and von Solms 
(1997) 
X X     
Spurling (1995) X X     
Akers and Sellers (1994)     X  
Lafleur (1992) X     X 
Murray (1991) X X     
Straub (1990)     X  
Perry (1985)  X  X X X X 
Arvey and Ivancevich (1980)     X  
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